June 5–10 – A fragile peace
The soldiers stood at attention in Tiananmen, not as conquerors but as walls.
The students who had been herded out on June 4 came back in smaller numbers, milling in the side streets, waving leaflets, chanting slogans at patrols. The city was quieter, but not calm — more like a pot that had been taken off the boil, but was still steaming.
Zhao Ziyang walked the Square in civilian clothes, speaking to shopkeepers and students. His presence drew less attention than Hu’s, but his message was the same: “The dialogue is not over. The nation will not punish you for loving your country.”
Hu Yaobang stayed inside Zhongnanhai for most of that week. He was exhausted — not physically, but from the pull between his reformist heart and his loyalty to the Party that had made him. In meetings, he defended the restraint of June 4 as “proof the people’s army is the people’s army.”
The conservatives didn’t see it that way. Wang Zhen called it “the greatest loss of face since 1949.” Bo Yibo warned that “in our system, weakness invites more challenge.”
June 11 – The closed meeting
Deng called the Politburo Standing Committee to Huairen Hall. The meeting lasted six hours.
It wasn’t shouting; it was worse — long silences, the weight of words measured before they were dropped on the table.
- Wang Zhen demanded Hu’s removal: “A General Secretary who sides with the street is no longer a General Secretary — he is a candidate for the street.”
- Hu Yaobang: “If we cannot stand with our people when they ask for justice, what are we for?”
- Bo Yibo: “Comrade Hu, you speak as if the Party is apart from the people. We are the people, but we must guide them.”
- Deng Xiaoping: “Guiding means more than ordering. Ordering means more than pleasing. Both require knowing when to step forward, and when to step back.”
When the meeting adjourned, no vote was taken. Hu kept his seat. But Deng’s expression as he left was not relief — it was calculation.
June 13–20 – Two Beijings
In one Beijing — the official one — work units returned to routine, ration coupons were clipped, the People’s Daily printed features about grain production.
In the other — the lived one — students still held evening vigils near the Square, workers still met quietly to discuss petitions, and whispered jokes about the Party’s “soft martial law” circulated in teahouses.
Internationally, China’s image was oddly improved compared to our reality: foreign journalists noted “a measured resolution,” and Hong Kong papers ran op-eds about a “new maturity” in Beijing’s leadership. But Western governments still warned about “human rights concerns” and froze some aid programs.
June 21 – Deng’s walk
Deng took his habitual walk in the Zhongnanhai gardens with only his secretary a few steps behind. The willows were thick with summer, and the koi in the ponds swirled lazily.
He spoke as if to the air:
“When I was young, I thought politics was the courage to say yes or no.
In war, yes and no are simple — you fight or you don’t.
In peace, yes and no are threads in the same rope. Pull one too hard, the rope frays.
The trouble with Hu is not that he is wrong — it’s that he is right too soon.
And I… I am too old to tie a new rope.”
The secretary didn’t answer. Deng’s voice had the weight of a man making peace with something, but not yet saying it aloud.
Late June – Deng’s final choice
On June 28, Deng called Hu to his private study. The two men sat across from each other without tea — a sign it would be short.
- Deng: “You have defended the Party from its own worst instincts this month. For that, I thank you.”
- Hu: “Then keep me where I am, and let us finish the work.”
- Deng: “The work will not be finished in my lifetime, or yours. But it will not begin again if the Party is broken. You cannot be both the Party’s shield and its spur. One will break the other.”
He did not remove Hu outright. Instead, Deng announced to the Standing Committee on June 30 that Hu would “take a step back from day-to-day affairs for health reasons” while retaining the title of General Secretary. Zhao would handle routine administration; Hu would focus on “long-term reform studies.”
It was a political sidelining, not a purge — Deng’s way of keeping Hu’s moral authority in reserve without letting him be the daily face of the Party.
July 1, 1989 – The Party’s birthday
At the official ceremony, Hu stood beside Deng on the rostrum, applauded by cadres who knew exactly what had happened. In the crowd below, a few students watched in silence. To them, Hu was still a symbol, but now a wounded one — a man inside the machine, but no longer at its controls.
Deng looked out over Tiananmen that day, and for a brief moment, the Square seemed to him like the rope he had described — taut, frayed in places, still holding, for now.
He knew he had bought time, not peace. And time, in politics, was the most expensive currency of all.
Key Political Figures – July 1989 (Alternate Timeline)
| Name | Age (1989) | Faction | Position | Post–June 4 Status | Notes & Background |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deng Xiaoping | 85 | Reform-leaning pragmatist | Chairman of CMC; Paramount Leader | Central arbiter; avoided purge & crackdown; preserved unity at cost of reform pace | Seen internationally as “restrained,” but conservatives complain of “loss of face.” |
| Hu Yaobang | 74 | Reformist | General Secretary (reduced role) | Symbolic leader; sidelined from daily work for “health” | Moral authority intact; public sees him as voice of restraint, conservatives see him as liability. |
| Zhao Ziyang | 70 | Reformist | Premier; Acting day-to-day Party head | Gains operational power; bridge between Hu and Deng | Carefully avoids appearing to undermine Hu; keeps reform agenda alive quietly. |
| Wang Zhen | 79 | Hardline conservative | Vice President of PRC | Politically bruised; failed to force Hu’s removal | Still controls security channels; pushing for stricter controls on protests and press. |
| Bo Yibo | 81 | Opportunist/Neutral | Vice Premier (Economic Affairs) | Maintains flexibility; publicly backs Deng’s “balance” | Privately reassures both camps; positioning himself as kingmaker for next succession. |
| Chen Yun | 84 | Conservative economic planner | PSC Elder (semi-retired) | Influence via correspondence; unhappy with compromise | Calls for “tightening” economic policy; physically too frail for daily politics. |
| Peng Zhen | 87 | Centrist institutionalist | NPC Chairman | Supports legislative approach to reform; minor political boost | Advocates anti-corruption trials to defuse public anger; aligns loosely with Zhao. |
| Yang Shangkun | 82 | Military-leaning centrist | Exec. Vice Chair of CMC | Key in keeping PLA neutral during standoff | Trusted by Deng; ensures orders remain under tight political control. |
| Li Peng | 61 | Younger conservative | Vice Premier (Infrastructure Oversight) | Marginalized after June failure; loses ground to Zhao | Still allied with Wang Zhen; waiting for new opening to reassert influence. |
| Li Ruihuan | 55 | Reformist rising star | Party Secretary of Tianjin | Reputation strengthened by peaceful protest handling | Increasingly seen as next-gen reformist leader; careful not to antagonize conservatives. |
| Qiao Shi | 65 | Reformist pragmatist | Head of Central Organization Department | Protecting reformist cadre network | Avoids public profile; keeps loyalists in key provincial posts. |
| Student Leaders | 20–24 | Independent reformists | Informal protest leadership | Split between moderates willing to pause & radicals calling for continued action | Some leave Beijing; others attempt to organize national petition campaigns. |
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